This paper is about the semantics of wh-phrases. It is argued that wh-phrases should not be analyzed as indefinites as, for example, Karttunen (1977) Schwarzschild's (1999) information-theoretical approach to F-marking and accent placement, and-second -its consequences with respect to the focus/background structure of wh-questions will be outlined.
Direct Answers, Focus, Background Deletion
Since the work of Hermann Paul (1920) and M.A.K. Halliday (1967) it has been commonly assumed that in well-formed, i.e., congruent, question/ answer sequences (Q/A-sequences) there is a systematic correlation between the wA-question Q and the focus/background structure (F/B-structure) of its direct sentential answers A, cf. (1).
(1) If A is a direct/congruent answer to β, then every constituent in A that corresponds to a wA-phrase in Q is focused (i.e., F-marked).
This generalization can be illustrated by the Q/A-sequences given in (2). In (2a) the constituent Mary corresponds to the wA-phrase who, and Mary must be focused; in (2b) Mary corresponds to who, John corresponds to whom, and both must be focused. Given that the generalization in (1) is in fact basically correct, then (2c) shows that the property of being focused does not coincide with the property of being accented in a strict sense, but that a focused and accented constituent may license an abstract focus (F-marking) on a larger constituent containing it. Dynamically speaking, the focus on John (the 'focus exponent') in (2c) 'projects up to the rAar-clause' in a way to be specified. It should be emphasized that the generalization given in (1) does not entail that every focused constituent in a direct answer A needs to correspond to a wA-phrase in the respective wA-question Q. Actually, such a claim would be far too strong, for one always has to reckon with the presence of so-called 'contrastive topics,' cf. For reasons of space, however, the possibility of contrastive topics will be almost completely ignored in the remainder of this paper.
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As presented here, the generalization in (1) is intended in the first instance as a generalization about sentential answers. Typically, however, questions are not answered by sentential answers but by 'short' or so-called 'term answers,' cf. (4) and (5). This immediately raises the question of whether, and -if so -in what way, sentential answers and term answers are related to each other. Apart from the obvious parallel between the F/B-structures of sentential For further discussion, cf. e.g. During (1997) , Krifka (1998) , Reich (2001). answers in (2) and (3) and the term sequences in (4) and (5), there are good reasons to assume that the latter are derived from the former by some kind of elliptical process. To mention just two arguments, term answers and the respective wA-phrases must agree in case, cf. (6), and term answers may occur in the form of reciprocals, cf. (7). Both phenomena, however, are known to be strictly local, confined more or less to the minimal clause they are contained in. The way term answers are derived from sentential ones seems to be quite straightforward: starting from a well-formed sentential answer everything is phonologically reduced (p-reduced) that is not embedded in an F-marked node. Thus, this kind of elliptical process has to be conceived of as an instance of background deletion, and can be stated in a maximally theory neutral (and descriptive) manner as indicated in (8).
(8) Background deletion in Qj Α-sequences (optional) Let (Q, A) be a well-formed Q/A-sequence and let the F/B-structure of sentential A be of the form a 0 [/?O]F α ι [βι]ρ <*2 ---[ n -I]F <* n (where n > 1, αϊ, 0 < i < n, possibly null), then p-reduce ai for 0 < i < n: # 0
As recent research on ellipsis has shown, background deletion plays a crucial role in presumably all kinds of elliptical processes, and may thus be considered as a general strategy underlying elliptical phenomena in general. 5 Typically, this process is further restricted by additional syntactic and/or semantic requirements like, for example, 'directionality For further evidence, cf. e.g. Schwabe (1994) , Reich (2001) . In the following, I will always switch to German data if the point to be made can be better illustrated using German examples, or if the data is rather subtle. Cf. Rooth (1992b) , Tancredi (1992) , Klein (1993) , Romero (1998) , and Schwabe & Zhang (2000) among others.
requirements' in RNR-constructions (cf. e.g. Klein 1993 , Hartmann 1999 or 'correspondence requirements' in VP-ellipsis phenomena (cf. e.g. Fiengo & May 1994 , Merchant 1999 . However, apart from the implemented maximality condition, background deletion in Q/A-sequences seems to be fairly -though not completely -unrestricted (cf. Kuno 1982 Again, it is the constituent corresponding to the wA-phrase that constitutes the term answer and not the constituent in focus. Thus, this data together with the generalization about the derivation of term answers stated in (8) strongly suggests that it is not only the prenominal adjective that is F-marked, but in fact the whole constituent corresponding to the w/z-phrase. 7 Moreover, it suggests that this effect is due to some property of the w/z-phrases involved. This is what I will call the functional character of wA-phrases. The major claim I wish to argue for in this paper is that this property has to be located in the semantics of wA-phrases. Obviously, it may be immediately objected that this data merely shows that the above assumptions behind the derivation of term answers are too simplistic and must be revised or restricted in one way or another. The crucial point, however, is that there would seem to be no straightforward way of doing so without merely stating the facts; 8 and even if someone came up with a proposal, (8) still seems to be the null hypothesis and is, therefore, the theoretically preferred option. Hence, I will assume from now on that the constituents corresponding to a wA-phrase are in fact F-marked. Then, obviously, the question emerges, why 'standard approaches' to F-marking do not permit this F-marker, and whether there is any straightforward and natural way of modifying (one of) them in such a way that they do. 
The Problem within Projection Approaches
First of all, let's have a look at so-called 'projection theories,' the most prominent representative of which is presumably Selkirk (1984 Selkirk ( , 1996 . Selkirk (1996) assumes that F-marking is controlled by the set of rules given in (13) and (14).
(13) Basic Focus Rule
An accented word is F-marked.
(14) Focus Projection a. F-marking of the head of a phrase licenses the F-marking of the phrase.
Examples like (10) suggest that the derivation of term answers has to respect the 'minimal functional complex' containing the focus. This restriction may in fact lead to correct results in examples like (10), but it won't do so in more complex cases like (11) -cf. *Her BLUE convertible, vs. That he likes to drive her BLUE convertible. -or in cases where the term answer is constituted by a lexical projection, cf. (12). To my knowledge, the only approach to F-marking and accent placement that, in principle, allows for F-structures of the required kind is the one proposed in Jacobs (1988 Jacobs ( , 1991 . However, since this approach crucially relies on the assumption that syntactic F-marking is dependent on semantic focusing, it is certainly not an option in a framework in which syntax is assumed to precede semantic interpretation, like, e.g., the Chomskyan generative framework presupposed here.
b. F-marking of an internal argument of a head licenses the F-marking of the head. Now reconsider Schwarzschild's example (9) in the light of (13) and (14). The prenominal adjective blue is accented; hence it is F-marked by the Basic Focus Rule (13). However, being an adjunct, it cannot license F-marking of the non-accented head of the DP, cf. (14b). Since there is no other candidate that could license F-marking of the head, it must be concluded that the head is not F-marked. But since the head is not F-marked, F-marking of the DP isn't licensed either.
Is there a straightforward way of modifying this approach? As far as I can see, the answer is no. The crucial problem is that any mechanism that allows F-markers to project from prenominal adjectives to the DP containing them cannot prevent the F-marker from projecting to VP if the DP is an internal argument of the verbal head; i.e., the Q/A-sequence in (15) would be predicted to be well formed in general, especially in an out-of-the-blue utterance. 
The Problem within Information-Theoretical Approaches
The other prominent approach, which can be traced back to the work of Arnim von Stechow (cf. von Stechow 1981) but became well known with the work of Schwarzschild (1999), assumes a more direct connection between the information-theoretical notion of being 'given ' and F-marking. Schwarzschild (1999) provides us with two basic informationtheoretical principles, the first stating that non-F-marked constituents must be GIVEN, cf. (16), the second taking the form of an instruction to F-mark as little as possible, cf. (17).
(16) GiVENness If a constituent is not F-marked, it must be GIVEN.
(17) AvoiDF Do not F-mark.
Contrary to Selkirk's conception, the existence of an F-marker is not due to a constituent being accented; rather accenting is a consequence of F-marking. This is ensured by a constraint called Foe, cf. (18) . The distinction between Foe-marked and F-marked phrases, however, is not important for our purposes, since in all the relevant examples discussed so far each F-marked constituent is at the same time a Foe-marked constituent.
(18) Foe A Foe-marked phrase contains an accent.
There are two more things to say. First, it must be determined precisely what it means for a constituent to be GIVEN, cf. (19).
(19) Definition of GIVEN (partial, informal version) a. An utterance U counts as GIVEN iff it has a salient antecedent A and, modulo existential type-shifting, A entails the existential F-closure of U. b. Existential F-closure of U = the result of replacing F-marked phrases in U with variables and existentially closing the result, modulo existential type-shifting.
Second, it must be emphasized that the constraints GivENness, AvoioF and Foe are organized in an optimality theoretical manner, i.e., one is allowed to violate constraints according to the partial order given in (20 Again, the question to be answered is whether there is a straightforward way to modify this approach. This time the answer is 'yes, in principle.' The only reason why the DP must not be F-marked is a violation of AvoioF. 10 However, as is clear from (20), the constraint AvoioF can be violated if there is another constraint that is ranked higher. Since neither GivENness nor Foe will force F-marking on the DP, there must exist another, independently needed constraint allowing for violation of AvoioF. In the following two sections, it will be argued that there is in fact good evidence for the existence of a constraint with this property, a constraint allowing for the presence of (focus-sensitive) rhetorical relations.
A Slightly Modified Hamblin Approach: Functional wA-Phrases

Questions and Answers
Since it will turn out that one of the rhetorical relations to be licensed by this constraint is the Q/A-relation, the semantics of focus and the semantics of wA-interrogatives I am assuming need to be outlined. To this end, consider the well-formed Q/A-sequence in (22). Without offering an argument, 11 I will adopt the structured meaning approach to F/B-structures as developed in von Stechow (1981) and Cresswell & von Stechow (1982) , i.e., the F/B-structure in (22b), repeated as (23a), is represented as a structured proposition consisting of the focus 'Mary's red convertible' and the property 'being driven by John,' cf. (23b). Following Hamblin's (1973) dictum that "a question sets up a choicesituation between a set of propositions, namely, those propositions that 10 Note that the assumption that the whole DP is F-marked does not influence the realization of the accent within the DP. This is simply because this assumption results in one Foe-phrase being embedded within another.
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Cf. e.g. von Stechow (1991) for relevant discussion.
count as answers to it," and taking the insight into account that F/B-structures are at the heart of the Q/A-relation, it is perfectly straightforward to construe a question like (22a), repeated here as (24a), as denoting a set of structured propositions, cf. (24b), and more precisely (24c). Thus, wA-interrogatives are still taken to denote sets of possible answers; the notion of being a possible answer, however, has now been relativized to possible F/B-structures.
Wh-Phrases as Functional Expressions
Of course, the propositions contained in the denotation of a wA-interrogative must be structured independently. This is precisely what I take to be the task of w>A-phrases. Concretely, I propose to analyze wA-phrases not as a (type-shifted) variant of indefinites like something, cf. (25a), but as primarily functional expressions with an indefinite core that shape the F/B-structure of possible answers, cf. (25b).
Being 'hybrid' in nature, i.e., a combination of the structured meaning approach to F/B-structures and the propositional approach to the semantics of (wA-)questions, this approach inherits both the structural information encoded by the structured meaning approach to F/B-structures (or its relative, the categorial approach to (wA-)questions) and -given a suitable type-system as developed in Reich (2001) -the type-uniformity of the propositional approach. Presupposing a theory of propositional attitudes as developed e.g. in Cresswell & von Stechow (1982) , this approach obviously allows for a theory of question embeddings in the spirit of Karttunen (1977) . In the following, the variable ρ is intended to range over structured propositions (as well as unstructured ones).
Given this, the well-formedness condition imposed on Q/A-sequences can be reduced to the simplest condition one can think of, namely the e-relation, cf. (26).
As will be clear from the discussion in section 4, the generalization given in (1) is a direct consequence of the well-formedness condition (26) imposed on Q/A-sequences. As far as the logical form and the interpretation of wA-interrogatives are concerned, the functional view on wA-phrases is in essence consistent with the 'traditional analysis' of wA-interrogatives within the generative framework (cf. e.g. von Stechow 1993), i.e., a wA-interrogative like (27a) is analyzed on the level of logical form as indicated in (27b). (27) }4 The wA-phrase what, finally, singles out from this set the property 'being driven by John,' Xx\.thai John drove x\, and builds the set of structured propositions consisting of all and only those structured propositions (w, Aj.John drove y), where u is an individual that satisfies the restriction of the w/z-phrase involved. Exactly this is the intended result.
Integration into an Information-Theoretical Approach
Rhetorical Relations and the Restriction RHET-REL
The Rhetorical Relation answer
Actually, my claim above to the effect that the answer (23a) denotes a structured proposition, was oversimplifying a trifle. The structured meaning approach -at least in its standard formulation -is a focus movement approach and the movement of the focus has to be triggered somehow. 15 In the spirit of Jacobs (1984) , I assume therefore that focus movement is always triggered by an operator, in the case of so-called 'free foci' by a rhetorical relation, and in the special case of answers by a rhetorical relation that I shall dub answer. The rhetorical relation As far as I know, Hamblin (1973) was the first to make seminal use of what I call 'Hamblin-abstraction' within his set-based model for natural language interpretation. Rooth (1985) , and others following him, referred to Hamblin-abstraction when modelling the semantics of 'association with focus,' albeit on a different level of interpretation. It should be mentioned that the use of Hamblin-abstraction presupposes a formal language that allows for expressions denoting functions from variable assignments to 'common denotations,' i.e., a language like the one developed in Montague (1970) . For a similar model, as well as a precise definition of Hamblin-abstraction, the reader is referred to Reich (2001) . It is a well-known problem that, in general, focus movement leads to the violation of island constraints, cf. e.g. the discussion in von Stechow (1991). In Reich (2001) , however, it is argued that there is an independently justified variant of the structured meaning approach that substitutes focus binding for focus movement, thus avoiding the problem of violating island constraints. But to keep things simple, I will stick to the movement approach for the remainder of the paper.
answer is a two-place relation that first binds the focus (the foci) in the answer (via coindexation) und thus triggers the generation of a structured proposition, cf. (28) and, third, checks whether the generated structured proposition is a possible answer to the question, i.e., whether it is an element of the question's denotation, cf. (29).
Now, almost everything is available that is needed to systematically coerce F-marking of the constituents corresponding to w/z-phrases. What remains to be done is to introduce an additional constraint on F-marking allowing, in principle, for the presence of the necessary F-markers to fulfill the requirements of the focus-sensitive rhetorical relation answer -1 call this constraint RHET-REL (RHETorical-RELation), cf. The well-formedness condition of Q/A-sequences stated in (26) thus turns out to follow directly from the interplay of the semantics of focus, the semantics of wA-constructions, and the semantics/pragmatics of the rhetorical relation answer, as licensed by the constraint RHET-REL overruling AvoinF.
The Rhetorical Relation contrast
It should be emphasized that the assumption of an additional constraint RHET-REL is in fact independently motivated by examples involving so-called 'contrastive focus,' cf. e.g. the German data in (31).
In fact, I am assuming that any rhetorical relation must behave focus-sensitively. It may turn out that this requirement is too strict; nevertheless it seems to constitute a reasonable methodological guideline. (31) (31b) is GIVEN in the context of (31 a). Since they are all GIVEN, none of them has to be F-marked (GivENness); since none of them has to be F-marked, F-marking is ruled out by AvoioF. The constituent Alex, however, does carry an accent, and therefore has to be F-marked.
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This again raises the question of what it is that overrules the constraint AvoroF and licenses F-marking of the constituent Alex.
The answer I wish to argue for is that the possibility of F-marking the constituent Alex is due to the presence of a rhetorical relation contrast binding kontrastive foci.' This in turn raises the question of how to define such a rhetorical relation. To see this, consider the following examples typically being discussed under the notion 'contrastive focus' (cf. e.g. Rochemont 1986 , Rooth 1992a Structurally, the examples cited in (32) all have one property in common: each of them contains at least two (maximal) constituents of the same category (DP, VP, or S) differing in focus, but identical in background. In (32a), for example, the DP an [ AMErican] F farmer is contrasted with the DP a [CaNAdian] F farmer and vice versa, the focus simply serving the purpose of ensuring comparability on the one hand, and dinstinctiveness in denotation on the other. I conclude from this data that the rhetorical The accent observed is definitely not a default accent in all-given utterances, for in German the default accent in all-given utterances is typically realized on the inflected part of the predicate, cf. Reis (1989) . relation contrast may adjoin at LF at any constituent (quite similar to Rooth's 1992a operator ~Γ), but needs to bind at least one focus in its scope. (32a), for example, is represented at the level of LF as (33a), and interpreted as (33b).
contrast((Canadian, /Uf.an A' farmer)))
As far as truth-conditions are concerned, contrast is simply vacuous, cf. (34b); contrast presupposes, however, the presence of a contextually salient LF-constituent differing in focus, but matching the background of the structured meaning in its scope, cf. (34b).
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(34) a. contrast((a, β))= b. contras t((a, β)) is defined iff there exists a contextually salient
Definition (34) together with the constraint RHET-REL on F-marking therefore does not only account for the specifics of the F/B-structures in examples like (31) and (32), but also for the specific interpretational effect -contrastiveness -triggered by their use. Having defined the rhetorical relation contrast, we are now in a position to give a fully explicit account of Schwarzschild's convertible example (9), repeated here as (35) In section 3 it has been argued that the w/z-interrogative (35a) denotes the set {{w, /be. that John drove x}\ u is a driveable object} of structured propositions. Consequently, any declarative that is meant to answer the question (35a) necessarily needs to be F-marked on the constituent corresponding to the wA-phrase what in (35a). Although this constituent is
It should be noted that the definition of contrast in (34) does not directly capture the existence of asymmetric contrastive foci. As far as I can see, however, there is in principle no problem with generalizing (34) in such a way that asymmetric contrastive foci can be accounted for too.
GIVEN in the relevant sense, and so F-marking should be suppressed by AvoioF, the F-marker is licensed by the constraint RHET-REL when it is bound by the rhetorical relation answer; the focus on the constituent blue constitutes a symmetric (or asymmetric) contrastive focus that is bound by the rhetorical relation contrast. All in all, both the sentential answer in (35b) and the term answer in (35c) are represented as (36a) on the level of logical form, and they are interpreted as indicated in (36b). (36) Thus, based on the definitions of the rhetorical relations answer and contrast and the availability of the constraint RHET-REL, (35b) and (35c) are correctly predicted to be well-formed answers in the context of (35a). 
Functional expressions and the restriction FuNcE
In the last part of this paper, I shall outline an important consequence of the functional view on w/z-phrases for the F/B-structure of wA-interrogatives.
As the reader may have noticed, there are now two possible explanations for the F-marking on the adjective blue in (36a): on the one hand, F-marking is required to fulfill the rhetorical relation contrast; on the other, a lack of F-marking would violate the constraint GrvENness. Note, however, that the observed redundancy effect is not a general one and cannot be avoided in the proposed extension of Schwarzschild's approach, for, in general, neither GrvENness (plus AvoioF) is able to account for the F-markers required by RHET-REL (cf. subsections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2), nor is RHET-REL able to account for the F-markers required by GivENness (cf. e.g. the F-marker on the adjective blue in a discourse sequence like the following: Which convertible did John like best? [The [BLUE] F convertible] p-)> Nevertheless, as proposed by both anonymous reviewers, the observed redundancy effect may be taken to suggest establishing RHET-REL as a totally independent constraint, as opposed to the GivENness constraint. Actually, this would amount to positing the existence of two different kinds of foci, one resulting from deaccentuation and the other from focusation (by virtue of RHET-REL). In the end, this may turn out to be the correct approach. However, given that such an approach certainly does not eliminate the observed redundancy, but in addition requires a theory relating both kinds of focal operations, I will stick to the formulation given above as long as there is no empirical evidence to the contrary.
It is well known that w/z-phrases in German (at least in simple w/z-interrogatives) are typically unaccented, cf. (37a) vs. (37b), although they do not constitute GIVEN information in a strict sense. As Reis (1989) points out the most straightforward way to account for this data is to assume that, in general, wA-phrases in German are simply not F-marked. This fully accords with the observation made in Rosengren (1991) that, in German, the F/B-structures of wA-interrogatives seem to be subject to exactly the same regularities as the F/B-structures in declaratives. Moreover, Ladd (1996:171) reports that in Turkish, a wh-in-situ language, wA-phrases even need to carry an accent, cf. (41).
(41) Halil'eNE verdiniz Haul WHAT you-gave 'What did you give to Halil?' Obviously, this data suggests rather that wA-prases are focused than that they are not (cf. e.g. Rochemont 1986). But provided that the functional view on wA-phrases is basically correct, this data may be accounted for in a fairly natural way without assuming that wA-phrases are focused (i.e., F-marked) in German (and English): whereas the property of structuring propositions is part of the lexical semantics of wA-phrases in German (and English) -so that wA-phrases in German (and English) must be conceived of as functional elements -wA-phrases in Turkish seem to lack this very property and therefore must be considered as non-functional in this respect; since, however, for reasons of Q/A-congruence, the propositions in the question's denotation require structuring, this task falls to a genuine syntactic mechanism, namely focusing. As a welcome consequence, we can stick to the assumption that any F(oc)-marked phrase contains an accent, cf. (18) 43c), we allow the pragmatic effects triggered by focusing functional expressions to be derived from the presence of covert rhetorical relations, e.g. the rhetorical relation contrast.
In Bresnan (1971) it was observed that wA-phrases are patterned like indefinites with respect to accent: whereas pronominal expressions like what or something are typically unaccented, the restriction of a more complex expression like which car or some car requires accenting. Concerning indefinites, this behavior is a direct consequence of their semantics: unlike the complex indefinite some car -carrying a non-trivial restriction -the pronominal indefinite something is always GIVEN, since its existential closure ('there is some property P that is true of some individual *') is entailed by any discourse. Now, if it were assumed that wA-phrases and indefinites are semantically equivalent, exactly the same reasoning would account for the behavior of wA-phrases in English and German. Disregarding the main argument in this paper for a moment, why should we then assume that wA-phrases in English and German are functional expressions rather than indefinites? The reason is that if we treated wA-phrases as semantically equivalent to indefinites, it would be totally unexpected that pronominal wA-phrases in Turkish need to carry an accent. If, however, wA-phrases in German and English are considered as functional expressions, a straightforward explanation is available (see the discussion above): contrary to wA-phrases in German and English, wA-phrases in Turkish are nonfunctional and so need to be focused for reasons of Q/A-congruence; given a suitable binder -possibly a focus-sensitive variant of the interrogativator'?' -, focusing is, once more, licensed by the constraint RHET-REL overruling AvoioF.
Summary
On the basis of the assumption that term answers are derived from sentential ones by eliding their background, I have argued that wA-phrases should be considered as functional expressions shaping the F/B-structure of possible answers. I therefore proposed that wA-interrogatives should be treated as denoting sets of structured propositions and that the well-formedness condition on Q/A-sequences should be derived from the interaction of the semantics of wA-questions, the semantics of F/Bstructures, and the semantics/pragmatics of rhetorical relations. In order to coerce F-marking of the constituents corresponding to a u>A-phrase, I proposed extending Schwarzschild's approach to F-marking by adding a further constraint called RHET-REL overruling AvoroF. Finally, I showed that the assumption that wA-phrases are functional expressions allows their peculiar behavior with respect to accenting to be considered as an instance of a more general phenomenon, one that can be captured by an independently required constraint FUNCE. The proposed extension of Schwarzschild's approach can be summarized as follows: (44) Finally, it should be pointed out that the mechanics introduced so far need to be generalized with respect to complex wA-phrases like whose mother or how many apples', this, however, is yet another -and undoubtedly complex -story. 
